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The Acquisition and Analysis of Electroencephalogram Data for the Diagnosis of Benign Partial 
Epilepsy of Childhood with Centrotemporal Spikes 
 
by 
 
Jessica Anne Scarborough 
 
 In this thesis, I will expand upon each step in the process of acquiring and analyzing 
electroencephalogram (EEG) for the classification of benign childhood epilepsy with 
centrotemporal spikes. Despite huge advancements in the field of health informatics—natural 
language processing, machine learning, predictive modeling—there are significant barriers to the 
access of clinical data. These barriers include information blocking, privacy policy concerns, and 
a lack of stakeholder support. We will see that these roadblocks are all responsible for stunting 
biomedical research in some way, including my own experiences in acquiring the data for the 
second chapter of this thesis.  
This second chapter expands upon just one possible advancement that can be achieved 
when researchers attain clinical data (in this case, EEG data). BECTS is a type of epilepsy that 
only displays epileptiform activity on night-time EEGs. We hypothesize that a brain affected by 
BECTS is also developmentally different during the daytime, and based on this assumption, our 
analysis aims to uncover these electrodynamic distinctions. After course-graining raw EEG 
segments, we extracted sample entropy, recurrence rate, laminarity, and determinism using 
 6 
recurrence quantitative analysis. Our results displayed two major findings. First, awake BECTS 
and control patients can be classified with no overlap using all of these features. Second, BECTS 
patients show differences in sleep state RQA values from centrotemporal and non-
centrotemporal regions. We cannot confirm if these differences display epileptiform activity, 
however, because we do not have controls for sleep studies. With proper development and 
implementation, this research has the potential to become a clinical decision support tool and 
decrease the need for inconvenient sleep studies.  
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I. Accessing Clinical Data for Research 
A. Background 
 
Despite a large push for health scientists to explore the world of big data (Khoury & 
Loannidis, 2014; Margolis et al., 2014), attaining useful health data remains a firm roadblock in 
much of health informatics research. The United States government has invested almost $30 
billion into the development, regulation, and incentivizing of electronic health records (EHRs), 
yet the promises of an interoperable health information exchange (HIE) have not been realized 
(Marchibroda, 2014). Individual EHR vendors often act as data silos, and institutions are unable 
to effectively communicate with each other. Likewise, researchers often report unreasonable 
challenges when attempting to gather data in a usable manner from third-party EHRs, medical 
devices, and medical data collection software. In some cases, these third-party vendors may be 
attempting to block the transfer of information to make it difficult to change software, known as 
“locking in” users (ONC, 2015, pp. 13, 17-18). Ubiquitous and often unfounded fears of the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule can be heard in research laboratories and institutional review board (IRB) 
meetings in academic medical centers across the country. Many of these challenges can be 
overcome with the if stakeholders to health software development, government policy, and 
hospital administration support the needs of researchers. In this chapter, I will discuss why 
access to clinical data remains a significant barrier to biomedical research and recent policy and 
culture changes that have the potential to ease these burdens. 
 
B. Barriers to Clinical Data Access 
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There is a scarcity of formal studies regarding the complications in attaining medical data 
for biomedical and public health research (ONC, 2015, p. 7). Despite this, there is significant 
anecdotal evidence from conference proceedings and online informatics discussions that points 
to significant limitations faced by researchers trying to obtain data. Using these complaints as a 
foundation, I procured empirical evidence and government reports regarding significant 
obstructions researchers find when attempting to utilize biomedical research data. Throughout 
this chapter, I will demonstrate three major barriers in accessing medical data for research: 
1. Information Blocking 
2. Privacy Law Concerns 
3. Lack of Stakeholder Support 
As defined by the ONC, information blocking occurs “when persons or entities 
knowingly and unreasonably interfere with exchange or use of electronic health information” 
(ONC, 2015, p. 11). Next, concerns related to the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) are often misdirected (Herdman, Moses, States, & (U.S.), 2006), as 
protected health information is removed from most research data in a process known as de-
identification. Despite this, these concerns play a significant role in stunting medical research 
(Dunlop, Graham, Leroy, Glanz, & Dunlop, 2007). The final barrier, a lack of stakeholder 
support, is demonstrated with anecdotal evidence and the need for government intervention to 
achieve “meaningful use” of electronic health records. 
 
Information Blocking 
Information blocking, a term that was first formally defined by the Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC)(Adler-Milstein & Pfeifer, 2017), refers 
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to actions taken by individuals or entities who purposefully block or hinder the transfer of health 
information without reason (ONC, 2015, p. 11). Information blocking is an act that is difficult to 
define, because an individual or entity is only committing information blocking (as defined by 
the ONC) if they are aware that their actions are preventing the reasonable transfer of health 
information. Purposefully preventing information exchange to comply with privacy laws is a 
“reasonable” action; therefore, doing so would not be considered information blocking. 
Conversely, deliberately citing a privacy law (e.g. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule) as an excuse for not 
sharing patient health information is considered an act of information blocking (ONC, 2015, p. 
16).  Figure 1 below visualizes these three requirements in order for an act to be considered 
information blocking.  
 
Figure 1. Requirements to categorize an action as information blocking, as defined by the ONC. 
Taken from (ONC, 2015, p. 11) 
There are many motivations for individuals or entities to block the exchange of health 
information—economic, technological, and practical—that are documented from anecdotal 
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evidence. Although health IT developers (software vendors) are the primary culprits of 
information blocking (ONC, 2015, p. 15),  some providers may see an economic incentive to 
preventing the authorized transfer of medical records in order to impede patients from leaving 
their practice. Vendors may purposefully not pursue reasonable technological advances that 
increase interoperability in order to “lock-in” providers to one system (ONC, 2015, p. 13).  
Information blocking has been discussed anecdotally since the advent of the Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act and the subsequent 
push for interoperability in healthcare. These concerns were brought to a national stage when the 
ONC published an information blocking report in April 2015 (ONC, 2015). This report took aim 
at EHR vendors who are believed to partake in the majority of information blocking, outlined 
mechanisms used to unnecessarily impede the transfer of health data, and laid out steps for 
remedying the situation. This report, however, is not intended to act as the final investigation into 
information blocking (ONC, 2015, pp. 19-20, 29). There are approximately 60 unsolicited 
complaints made to the ONC regarding information blocking in 2014 alone (ONC, 2015, p. 15). 
These complaints, along with some empirical evidence, are at the foundation of the report to 
Congress. Even with this evidence, the ONC strongly recommends that additional research is 
performed to confirm or disprove anecdotal complaints and gather more information from the 
perspective of providers and vendors being accused of information blocking (ONC, 2015, pp. 19-
20).  
In this report and later publications, the ONC outlines various methods that vendors and 
providers use to block the appropriate transfer of patient information; many of these information 
blocking techniques affect research in addition to clinical care. For example, the ONC states that 
complaints have been made alleging that “developers may be engaging in information blocking 
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as a means of ‘locking in’ providers and consumers to rigid technologies and information sharing 
networks that reinforce the market dominance of established players and prevent competition 
from more innovative technologies and services” (ONC, 2015, pp. 17-18). When EHRs act as 
data silos, clinical experiences suffer. Providers are unable to access family history, drug 
allergies, or previous test results if the patient hasn’t been seen at provider’s institution yet. 
Likewise, researchers may be unable to attain data, despite IRB approval for its extraction. The 
report continues, “Some of these developers cite security concerns and business justifications for 
these practices, while others provide no justification or, in some cases, appear to acknowledge a 
strong preference not to exchange information using federally adopted standards and to instead 
drive more users to exchange information using proprietary platforms and services.” This blatant 
preference for preventing data liquidity is damaging to current patients (who may receive sub-
optimal care when their medical records are not shared with authorized providers) and future 
patients (who could benefit from ground-breaking research that requires a decreased burden for 
HIE). The upcoming case study will demonstrate tangible consequences incurred when software 
developers force proprietary formatting of health data. Additionally, the inaccurate citation of 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. Although 
information blocking can occur in many forms, the outcomes are strikingly consistent to medical 
researchers—sample sizes drop, the significance of results is diminished, and/or research 
pursuits are abandoned altogether.    
The wide-ranging reactions to this report demonstrate that information blocking remains 
a contested issue. A letter of dissent, signed by the executives of Epic, Allscripts, McKesson, and 
other prominent EHR vendors, was presented to the ONC shortly after the publication of their 
report (Burchell et al., 2015). These vendors argued that what was described as “information 
 13 
blocking” in the report was not intentional, but rather, a result of the high cost of developing and 
maintaining an interoperable interface. In this letter, the vendors maintain that there aren’t 
enough users who want these features to justify their development. The ONC report, which was 
based significantly on anecdotal evidence, admits that further research must be done. Within the 
report, they state, “There is little quantitative data available with which to reliably identify and 
measure the extent of information blocking… In particular, ONC lacks methods and data to 
precisely determine why a provider is not exchanging when they should have the capability to do 
so.” Due to its recent publication, there has been minimal follow-up research published regarding 
information blocking since this report to Congress. Yet, the ONC is not the only organization 
that believes EHR vendors are purposefully failing to deliver products that allow for data 
transfer. In a 2012 article titled Escaping the EHR Trap—The Future of Health IT, Dr. Kenneth 
Mandl and Dr. Isaac Kohane lament: 
We believe that EHR vendors propagate the myth that health IT is qualitatively different 
from industrial and consumer products in order to protect their prices and market share 
and block new entrants… This attitude has thwarted medicine's decades-long quest for an 
electronic information infrastructure capable of providing a dynamic and longitudinal 
view of the health care of individuals and populations. EHR companies have followed a 
business model whereby they control all data, rather than liberating the data for use in 
innovative applications in clinical care (Mandl & Kohane, 2012).  
 
 These authors, representing the Children’s Hospital Informatics program, the Harvard-
MIT Division of Health Sciences and Technology, and the Center for Biomedical Informatics at 
Harvard Medical School, note that despite general advancements in the field of data 
interoperability, EHR vendors have purposefully lagged behind these developments in order to 
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silo patient data. Although the ONC report is clearly based on anecdotal evidence, these 
complaints represent industry-wide concerns that cannot be dismissed.  
 
 In order to understand the causes of information blocking, EHR vendors must grant 
some transparency regarding their practices and contracts. The ONC expressed concern that 
attaining quantitative answers regarding the prevalence and mechanisms of information blocking 
(i.e. differences in charges for transferring data between institutions) is particularly challenging 
due to “gag clauses” often found in vendor agreements between providers and EHR companies 
(ONC, 2015, p. 16). Said gag clauses can prevent providers from discussing details of their 
contract, particularly cost. Given that intentionally prohibitive pricing is frequently referenced as 
a source of information blocking (ONC, 2015, p. 13), these restrictions limit the quantitative 
conclusions of any research on the matter (ONC, 2015, pp. 31-32).  
Despite previously stated concerns regarding the shortage of empirical evidence related 
to information blocking, congress has moved quickly to improve standards for HIE. The 21st 
Century Cures Act, written and passed with bipartisan support, was signed into law by President 
Obama at the end of 2016. In addition to increasing funding to medical research substantially, 
this legislation aims to improve HIE interoperability by setting data exchange standards and 
barring acts of information blocking("21st Century Cures Act," 2016). Due to its recent 
enactment, the long-term effects of this law are unknown, but it is undoubtedly a step towards 
progress in achieving an interoperable healthcare system. Given that most EHR vendors appear 
to believe that their practices do not constitute information blocking, it is possible that more 
action will be necessary to create change in the private sector. This legislation does, however, set 
a tone for the expectations vendors will be held to for achieving continued Meaningful Use 
certification. If methods for detecting and discouraging information blocking are implemented in 
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addition to this redefined tone, the United States healthcare system will take a large step towards 
interoperability—leading to an improved standard of care and biomedical research.  
Privacy Law Concerns 
The introduction and implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) was not met with enthusiasm from all providers. In theory, HIPAA 
was designed to improve patient privacy and electronic billing, yet many practitioners saw these 
rules as onerous, costly, and unconducive to quality care (Barieri, 2003; Bowers, 2001; 
Kumekawa, 2005). As a field, healthcare is notoriously resistant to change; still, over 20 years 
later, HIPAA has become an accepted industry standard, safeguarding the privacy of patients and 
their protected health information (PHI) (Solove, 2013). Despite this acceptance in the clinical 
world, concerns related to HIPAA (some reasonable and some unfounded) continue to hinder the 
progress of medical research (Dunlop et al., 2007; Gostin & Nass, 2009; Wei, 2015).  
Apprehensions related to the inappropriate disclosure of PHI typically reference 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule. This rule sets standards for the protection of PHI within a covered entity. 
These covered entities include health plans, health clearinghouses, and healthcare providers. Per 
Susan McAndrew, the Deputy Director for Health Information Privacy in the Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR), data that have already been excised from a covered entity (e.g. de-identified and 
moved into a data warehouse) are no longer a concern of the Privacy Rule (Herdman et al., 2006, 
p. 8).  Regulations are concerned with patient information that is being transferred between 
covered entities or between a covered and non-covered entity. In these circumstances, the 
Privacy Rule stipulates limitations for the use and disclosure of PHI.  
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With biomedical research in mind, the Privacy Rule creates several approaches for the 
transfer of identified medical records outside of one covered entity. These include the following: 
(Herdman et al., 2006, pp. 8-9) 
1. Acquiring informed consent from each patient before recruitment into a study 
2. Obtaining institutional review board (IRB) approval for the use of a limited data 
set (may contain broad geographical information and some dates) 
3. (In very limited cases) Attaining IRB approval to use PHI without the patient’s 
consent, stipulating that this PHI will be protected and remain unpublished 
Although these procedures may delay research temporarily, it is not without good reason. 
This purpose is stated by Dr. Roberta Ness of the University of Pittsburg: “Researchers 
fundamentally believe in and are engaged in protecting confidentiality as much as is possible, 
because they fundamentally understand… that without the protection of confidentiality, there 
will be no trust in research and, therefore, [they] will be unable to conduct research.”  In addition 
to the ethical obligation to protect patient confidentiality, scientists also have benevolently 
selfish reasons for ensuring that PHI in their control remains secure. If the public’s faith in the 
protection of PHI is diminished, less patients will agree to sharing their data, leading to reduced 
research opportunities and weaker results. With that being said, these sensible privacy 
requirements may inherently cause a delay to biomedical research. For example, obtaining 
informed consent, writing IRB proposals, and attending IRB meetings all require time and 
resources. Even given these acceptable burdens, the observed impact to biomedical research is 
disproportionate to the intended pauses set forth by the Privacy Rule (Ness, 2007).   
Some inadvertent burdens that stem from the Privacy Rule are caused by confusion 
regarding what the IRB is capable of approving. One of their many roles, IRBs are responsible 
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for interpreting HIPAA regulations; as such, these review boards can waive requirements as they 
see fit (NIH, 2003). Nevertheless, according to Paul Feldman, Director of the Health Privacy 
Project, “IRBs believe they have no authority to approve alterations to or waivers of 
authorization for protocols not subject to the Common Rule. They do” (Herdman et al., 2006, p. 
21). This statement was made at a forum regarding the effect of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on 
health research in 2006. It is now over 10 years later and there is little written about whether 
current IRBs are willing to waive HIPAA requirements when given the appropriate 
documentation of purpose and security. It is likely that a lack of discussion on this topic is a 
positive outcome—fewer researchers are experiencing this issue making further investigations 
unnecessary. Lessons learned from the confusion surrounding the initial roll-out of HIPAA 
regulations should be documented in order to improve the implementation of future health 
privacy policies. 
De-identification, the process of removing PHI from medical records, is a common 
option for researchers wishing to attain patient data and avoid HIPAA constraints. There are two 
methods of de-identification, the “Expert Determination” method and the “Safe Harbor” method. 
The “Expert Determination” method, also known as the statistician method, requires that a 
person with appropriate field knowledge and statistical skills declares that the data is not 
individually identifiable ("Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996," 1996). 
Next, the “Safe Harbor” method, doesn’t require a statistician’s approval. Instead, de-
identification requires the removal of the 18 individual identifiers from medical records("Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996," 1996). These identifiers can be found in 
Appendix A. The removal of all patient identifiers is the overwhelming method of choice, 
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despite the possibility of gaining valuable demographic information in a secure manner through 
the “Expert Determination Method.” 
The Privacy Rule stipulates that records de-identified with “expert determination” can be 
shared freely (Amatayukal, 2003; NIH, 2004); nonetheless, misguided concerns regarding the 
ability to share de-identified data are often accepted as valid. The statistician method of de-
identifying data is not universally accepted by IRBs, because these boards are often unsure of 
how to regulate whether it is being done properly (Herdman et al., 2006, p. 22). A statistician’s 
endorsement that data has been appropriately de-identified is only as infallible as the 
assumptions said statistician made during the evaluation process (Herdman et al., 2006, p. 17). 
For example, the statistician is only required to certify that the risk of re-identification is “very 
small,” but per guidance published by the Department for Health and Human Services (HHS), 
there is no definition for what “very small” is. Given these uncertainties, IRB concern may be 
warranted.  
In addition to good faith concerns, IRBs can be unsure of their liability for guaranteeing 
that de-identification is performed to adequate standards. By the very nature of IRB 
independence from a central agency, board requirements and decisions can differ widely 
between organizations (Herdman et al., 2006, pp. 25-28). While some variation is inevitable, not 
permitting a Privacy Rule-approved method of de-identification because of unfamiliarity with 
the technique may create unfair differences between institutions. Resolving these concerns will 
require addressing IRB reservations and unfamiliarity with the statistician method. First and 
foremost, detailed documentation of the de-identification process should be provided to the IRB, 
including assumptions made and steps taken to ensure there’s a “very small” chance of re-
identification. HHS guidance regarding the two methods of de-identification, including a lengthy 
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explanation of the “Expert Determination” technique, can be found online (OCR, 2017). And 
IRBs that are unfamiliar with their role in overseeing a statistician de-identification process 
should be provided with mechanisms to increase their understanding and awareness of this 
method.  
The 21st Century Cures Act, touched upon in the “Information Blocking” section of this 
chapter, also works to improve medical research by lightening Privacy Rule restrictions for 
medical researchers. Before this update, PHI could be utilized by a covered entity for health care 
operations, including treatment, billing, and hospital procedures. This legislation now classifies 
research as part of “health care operations,” giving researchers and business associates within 
covered entities autonomous access to medical records. Additionally, when authorization forms 
are required, the forms specify “one-time” consent, where the authorization to use said data is 
indefinite unless the patient later revokes authorization. This PHI is still protected by the HIPAA 
Privacy and Security Rules, involving significant protection standards and breach notification 
rules. These alterations to the Privacy Rule have the potential to make a large impact by giving 
researchers access to data. In order to realize this full impact, however, IRBs must be informed 
and educated on these changes.   
HIPAA was not created with research as a priority. (Herdman et al., 2006, p. 13). This 
lack of foresight demonstrates a consequence of inconsistent stakeholder support in the pursuit of 
improving health research, which will be discussed further in the next section of this chapter. For 
good reason, obtaining medical records with PHI does require extra effort in obtaining patient 
consent or IRB approval. Yet, without the appropriate training in how to navigate these 
regulations, research will be stymied. 
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Lack of Stakeholder Support 
Clinical research has stakeholders in various sectors, ranging from clinicians to 
policymakers to medical institutions. In a clinical setting, the ability to acquire clinical data 
begins with data collection and storage mechanisms. The advent of electronic health records 
centered around improving patient care with increased safety, efficacy of treatments, and ease of 
billing. These are all crucial goals; yet, for the purposes of this discussion, these objectives make 
it clear that research was not a priority. We can therefore postulate that this lack of forethought 
provides some explanation for the difficulties encountered in obtaining data from electronic 
medical records. Stakeholders in clinical data collection and storage mechanisms traditionally 
include patients, clinicians, IT personnel, data warehouse engineers, hospital administrators, and 
corporate employees. Medical centers may choose to prioritize research as an institutional 
objective, adding additional stakeholders related to research and education. Simply put, there are 
fundamental differences in how various stakeholder prioritize institutional objectives. When 
choosing between electronic health record vendors and investment into backend design, 
corporate employees and administrators may focus on institutional reputation and budget-saving 
measures. When expressing their opinions regarding the use of technology in a clinical setting, 
clinicians and patients may believe improved workflow and diagnostic rates are fundamental to 
success. Research principle investigators, on the other hand, may prioritize a well-defined data 
warehouse that allows for the institution’s researchers to access de-identified data with ease.  A 
primary step to improving access to medical data in research must be coordinating stakeholder 
support of these goals.  
When included in the planning stages, these research stakeholders can influence 
fundamental government regulations, institutional mission statements, and organization cultural 
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attitudes related to the secure transfer of medical records.  To do so, however, all stakeholders 
must be invited to provide their expertise and opinions. According to Marcy Wilder, Esq., the 
lead lawyer working on HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, their team was not able to expand upon research 
regulations during the writing process, because there simply was a lack of expertise in the matter 
(Herdman et al., 2006, p. 14).  As discussed previously, some fundamental concerns related to 
the Privacy Rule may have been avoided if clinical research stakeholders played a role in writing 
said policy. And despite significant alterations to the Privacy Rule, which simplify the transfer of 
PHI to covered entity researchers, the academic field will need to be educated on these changes 
in order for them to be implemented fully.  
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid (CMS) has created more recent policy 
incentivizing electronic health records (EHRs) that adhere to Meaningful Use standards. These 
standards are an example of creating policies that work to appropriately prioritize research goals 
in addition to clinical health. Meaningful Use regulations incentivize eligible providers and 
institutions to utilize EHRs that meet or exceed expectations of utilizing electronic health records 
in a “meaningful” way. In addition to increasing patient safety (e.g. requiring EHRs to perform 
drug-drug or drug-allergy interaction checks in Stage 1), this program requires participants to 
eventually utilize EHRs that promote public health (e.g. standards for reporting to public health 
repositories) (CMS, 2010). Additionally, in the beginning of 2017, CMS created a centralized 
repository for this reporting (CMS, 2017). Agencies that are able to accept public health and/or 
clinical data may sign up to be included, allowing clinical data sources to report to multiple 
agencies connected through this centralized repository. Here, we can see a path towards the 
interoperability required for achieving some of the true potential that EHRs hold.  
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Finally, the importance of economic incentive cannot be understated. There is little 
speculation regarding why vendors and institutions may want to prevent the easy transfer of 
medical information; easily transferred data can lead to easily changed systems. To some degree, 
this economic incentive needs to be respected, because it is precisely why developers work to 
create innovative products; it is why large academic medical centers exist. However, the EHR 
software industry has been made possible by Meaningful Use incentives that have a clear 
intention of promoting a health care system that benefits from easy, secure information 
exchange. Software developers, therefore, must recognize when benefits to consumers greatly 
outweigh economic incentives. Likewise, economic interests could and should be leveraged as an 
advantage to creating interoperable systems. From the perspective of institutions, academic 
medical centers that invest in software that easily transfers health data can produce research with 
more impressive sample sizes, more impressive results. Good research encourages additional 
funding; additional funding improves hospital and medical school rank, attracting even better 
talent to pursue even better research. Vendors, too, can benefit from this cycle. Institutions that 
wish to leverage data-driven research will invest in EHR systems and other health IT software 
(i.e. EKG analysis software) that makes the transfer and de-identification of medical records 
simple. Vendors may be concerned about making their software interoperable, but the 
consequence of not doing so could be much worse—isolating themselves from a market that is 
demanding interoperability.  
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C. Case Study: Acquiring Clinical Data from Boston Children’s Hospital’s 
Child Neurology Department 
 
Background 
 Since the advent of health informatics, Boston Children’s Hospital (BCH) has been a 
leader in striving for innovative techniques that improve health care with the use of information 
technology (IT). Their Computational Health Informatics Program (CHIP) was awarded “Best 
Health Care Organization” by Health 2.0. In an award that took into consideration the last 10 
years of health technology innovation, Boston Children’s Hospital’s global reputation was 
clearly demonstrated with this recognition. Furthermore, research division has created an 
Innovation and Digital Health Accelerator, which hopes to vet and foster technologies that 
advance the field of digital health. With a focus in remote care, clinical decision support, and 
innovation platforms (i.e. Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources, also known as FHIR), 
Boston Children’s Hospital is a clear forerunner in the health informatics field. This forward-
thinking institution stands out with their investment in informatics, clearly recognizing the role 
that data-driven research will play in the future of medicine.  
Research pursued by CHIP includes Health Data Fusion, SMART Health IT, HealthMap, 
and Apache cTakes. Each of these endeavors requires significant amounts of health data 
(sometimes millions of patient records) and the infrastructure necessary to obtain, process, and 
store large amounts of data. Of note, SMART Health IT is a platform comprised of open 
standards and open source software that allows external innovators and researchers to design 
health applications that can be used across the healthcare field. For example, “Cardiac Risk” is 
an app that uses an interactive interface to show a patient’s risk of heart attack or stroke within 
the next 10 years. Once these tools are developed, applications may be added to the SMART 
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App Gallery at no charge. These applications can be “bolted on” to various health IT platforms. 
The very foundation of SMART Health IT relies on developers who are willing to share their 
standards, software, and applications with clinical and academic communities around the world. 
It is this culture of open innovation that feeds the research at Boston Children’s Hospital. Yet, 
despite a strong concentration in big data research, this case study will demonstrate that BCH 
researchers are not without their own plights when attempting to access clinical data.  
 My time spent at Boston Children’s Hospital enlightened me to the realities of accessing 
clinical records for biomedical research. To expand upon the research discussed in the following 
chapter, I traveled to BCH with the goal of extracting de-identified electroencephalogram (EEG) 
records from the Neurology Department’s electronic medical record system. We worked in 
conjunction with Dr. Tobias Loddenkemper, an Associate Professor of Neurology at Harvard 
Medical School, with over 250 publications. At BCH, he is the Director of Clinical Epilepsy 
Research within the Neurology Department. As seen in many departments at Boston Children’s 
Hospital, both excellence in clinical care and pioneering research are Neurology Department 
stakeholder priorities. During my time, I found that despite being a world leader in informatics 
and data-driven research, this clinical department still faces difficulties with fragmented, difficult 
to extract data.  
Results 
 I traveled to Boston Children’s Hospital with the goal of learning how to extract de-
identified EEG records to be included in on-going epilepsy research with Dr. William Bosl. Our 
research required de-identified EEGs stored in the European Data Format (EDF), a standard 
format for the storage and transfer of time series data (e.g. EEG data) (Kemp, Varri, Rosa, 
Nielson, & Gade, 1993). We were specifically aiming to extract EEGs from developmentally 
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normal patients and patients who are diagnosed with Benign Epilepsy with Centro-Temporal 
Spikes.  
Appropriate precautions were taken to adhere to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, but none of 
these proved onerous. For one, I completed HIPAA training modules to ensure my understanding 
and awareness of the policies researchers are expected to follow. Because my machine was not 
issued by Boston Children’s Hospital, virtual private network (VPN) software was installed. 
Within this VPN, I could access clinical data in a secure, HIPAA-friendly manner. Although 
these steps required additional time and resources, the value of keeping clinical data secure and 
private is worth these minimal burdens.  
With the goal of learning how to independently extract de-identified EEG records, I met 
with clinicians, researchers, and IT experts within the department of Neurology.  In these 
meetings, I learned that in the Department of Neurology, EEG data is not stored within or 
attached to the EHR system that contains the majority of each patient’s clinical data. This 
translates to manually searching the EEG collection software for each individual patient. 
Additionally, the EHR software has no querying capabilities. To a clinician, this is likely of little 
to no consequence. There’s little need for them to see “All patients billed with ICD code X” or 
“What percentage of patients are taking medication Y?” Yet, these capabilities may be 
fundamental to a researcher’s workflow. Without the ability to search for patients who were 
diagnosed with BECTS, Dr. Bosl and I relied on a list of patients provided by Dr. 
Loddenkemper. With this list, we could search through the EEG collection software to obtain the 
appropriate EEGs.   
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After selecting a patient of interest, a user selects the data they wish to extract (i.e. time 
segments of a chosen EEG recording), and they begin the export process. The EEG collection 
software exports data in the following two outputs:  
1. De-identified EEG data in proprietary formatting 
2. Identifiable EEG data in EDF formatting 
Unfortunately, neither of these options works, as we needed de-identified data in a research-
friendly (EDF) format. To achieve this desired output, researchers devised a workaround. First, 
they exported using the first option, de-identified data in the proprietary format. This file was 
then re-uploaded to the EEG collection software and re-exported in EDF using the second 
option. This left us with an EDF-formatted file with no PHI. This new procedure is relatively 
simple in theory, but in practice it changes a 5-minute export process to a 20-minute export 
process per patient. To achieve a 40-person sample-size, the export task went from requiring less 
than 3.5 hours to over 26.5 hours. In short, an assignment that could be accomplished in one 
morning now requires at least three full days’ worth of work.  
Plainly, this workaround is not ideal, and the researchers in this department have been in 
contact with the software developers for the EEG collection program. A continuing request for 
an option to download de-identified data into EDF format has been communicated to the 
developers for over a year with no response. Anecdotally, researchers have reported that other 
bugs and complaints have been addressed in software updates, but this request has been largely 
ignored.  
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Discussion 
 This experience at Boston Children’s Hospital demonstrates many of the barriers 
researchers face when attempting to access appropriate clinical data. Although extra steps were 
taken to adhere to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, they were not unreasonable. Conversely, despite 
being part of an institution that actively strides to promote research utilizing patient data, 
software shortcomings made the process decidedly difficult.  
An issue that effects both clinicians and researchers, it is disappointing to see clinical 
data such as EEG recordings not connected to a patient’s electronic medical record. Having data 
linked appropriately is an unobtrusively helpful feature to any medical team. Linked data allows 
clinicians to perform fundamental tasks, such as viewing both patient history and testing data 
(e.g. radiology report, blood test results, etc.) in the same application. In the Neurology 
Department at BCH, if a researcher comes across an anomaly in an EEG recording, there is no 
clinical data attached to the file to help elucidate this finding. Instead of an integrated platform, 
where the EEG results can be viewed within a patient’s EHR, researchers and clinicians are 
faced with two isolated systems.  
The demand to develop interoperable health systems is likely just breaching the market, 
and finding vendors that are willing to integrate with each other is difficult. SMART Health IT 
and SMART on FHIR hope to solve this issue by opening the market to software developers who 
are motivated to create health technology that prioritizes interoperability over data silos with 
“locked-in” customers.    
The additional barriers I came across, namely the inability to query the EHR and a 
challenging data export procedure, are prime examples of the consequences that stem from a lack 
of stakeholder support. The ability to query an EHR requires a significant investment in 
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development and resources, and discussing the logistics of creating such software could be a 
topic for another thesis. As most EHR software makes querying prohibitively difficult, 
organizations that wish to perform these tasks choose to export their data into a second, more 
analytics-friendly database (Mandl & Kohane, 2012). Still, an integrated querying feature would 
be a powerful tool in EHR software. If more research stakeholders were included in the planning 
stages of software development, these benefits could be articulated and the query functionality 
may be prioritized.  
Another instance of absent stakeholder support, EEG collection software developers are 
not prioritizing the production of the specified format export feature. Of note, stakeholder 
support of research needs is likely minimal within a clinical software company. It is likely that 
more important features are taking precedence, but without the company’s feedback it is 
impossible to be sure. There are always going to be “new and improved” features on the horizons 
for health IT development, and there is no shortage of wants from clinicians, researchers, and 
security specialists. Without a seat at the table, however, the wants and needs of researchers will 
be continually overlooked.  
 
D. Conclusion: Overcoming Barriers to Clinical Data Access 
 
As future informaticists, nearly every student in University of San Francisco’s Master of 
Science in Health Informatics (MSHI) program will face the persistent issue of encountering 
enticing data that is difficult to access, de-identify, or reformat. As such, it is imperative to 
understand these data acquisition challenges in order to achieve sought-after goals—the 
development of learning systems, clinical decision support tools, and natural language 
processing software.  
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Government policy has been an incredible driver in the advancement of the U.S. health 
care system, promoting HIE and interoperability, but some health policy did lead to unintended 
consequences. In both the case of HIPAA and Meaningful Use, the government stepped into the 
private health care sector in order to foster a secure and productive healthcare industry. Despite 
these common goals, the clear difference in consequences to biomedical research demonstrates 
that biomedical research was given much more consideration during the development of 
Meaningful Use. The HIPAA Privacy Rule was not intended to stymie research; that was made 
clear by the open-minded discussions and policy changes that followed the significant feedback 
submitted by medical researchers after deployment. Additionally, researchers are not advocating 
for weaker protection of PHI, especially when concerns are still being raised about the risks of 
re-identification (Benitez & Malin, 2010).  Yet, it is now clear that creating policy that affects 
research without including research stakeholders in the process led to unexpected results—
confusion on IRB responsibility, exceedingly cautious restrictions to access of patient data, and 
information blocking through inapplicable claims of Privacy Rule restrictions.  
 Changes in policy (i.e. The 21st Century Cures Act) and culture surrounding the transfer 
of health information to research professionals within a covered entity will require time and 
resources. Many organizations have decided to stop relying on third-party software vendors to 
prioritize the needs of research stakeholders; instead, they have sought in-house solutions. For 
example, academic medical centers in Cleveland, Ohio, have organized a research-friendly data 
warehouse that includes de-identified patient data from Cleveland Clinic, University Hospitals, 
and Metro Health Medical Center. All students and employees at any of these institutions are 
covered under the same IRB approval, allowing them to access this de-identified data without 
submitting a proposal. This effort is led by a research team at Case Western Reserve University’s 
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Institute for Computational Biology. BCH’s SMART Health IT is another demonstration of the 
changing culture surrounding health care interoperability. With developers striving to create 
open-API software that is accessible across platforms, SMART Health IT has created a path 
towards interoperability.  There are plenty of viable means to achieving interoperability, and 
choosing just one is wholly unnecessary. The most important step in accomplishing the goal of 
effortless HIE is continued motivation and stakeholder support; without it, incredible technology 
(such as the SMART “Cardiac Risk” platform) will remain isolated from health care clinicians 
and researchers.   
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II. Benign Partial Epilepsy of Childhood with Centrotemporal Spikes 
A. Background 
 
Epileptic encephalopathies are a relatively new category for seizures that present with 
developmental delays or even regression. These conditions are correspondingly associated with 
neurocognitive and behavioral dysfunction that may persist long after seizures cease, usually in 
early adolescence (Engel, 2001). While most research has focused on early warning signs of 
seizure onset, another significant challenge is to monitor brain development. In doing so, it may 
be possible to detect functional characteristics—biomarkers—that indicate the brain has entered 
a dynamical state in which seizures are likely to occur and to predict the developmental 
trajectory.  
 
Benign Childhood Epilepsy with Centro-Temporal Spikes 
Benign childhood epilepsy with centro-temporal spikes (BECTS), also known as 
Rolandic Epilepsy, is the focus of this research. With a typical onset age of 7-10, BECTS usually 
remits before the age of 18 (Callenbach et al., 2010). BECTS seizures typically occur during 
sleep and can be characterized as simple partial seizures that lead to motor, hemifacial, and rapid 
spasms (Miziara & Manreza, 2002). Despite its name, this “benign” epilepsy is associated with 
developmental delays. Rarely, BECTS has been shown evolve into more severe epilepsy types 
(e.g. continuous spike-and-wave during slow-wave sleep syndrome, Landau-Kleffner syndrome, 
intractable seizures, etc.) leading to even more severe neurological impairment (Callenbach et 
al., 2010; Joost Nicolai et al., 2007). Despite the developmental defects observed in children 
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diagnosed with BECTS (Callenbach et al., 2010), it is often left untreated due to comparable 
long-term effects from taking anti-epileptic medication (Kwan & Brodie, 2001; Shields & III, 
2009).  
Techniques for Complex Systems Analysis 
An automated method for quantifying epileptiform discharges in children has been 
developed by a co-investigator using a wavelet transform (Chavakula et al., 2013). Automated 
detection of continuous epileptiform activity is important because it can be present in the absence 
of overt seizures, yet has serious consequences. The complex systems methods developed in this 
project may be considered a further step in the development of automatic methods for detecting 
continuous spikes and waves during slow sleep (CSWS) and assessing severity. In another study 
by the co-investigator, spike counts were found to be relatively unaffected by confounding 
factors such as timing of epilepsy onset, clinical seizure type and frequency, and medication 
treatment and dose (Azhar, et al, in preparation). Furthermore, recently published research (W. J. 
Bosl, Tager-Flusberg, & Nelson, 2011) demonstrated that MSE could be used to distinguish 
infants at high risk for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) from those at low risk (on the basis of 
sibling history). A number of studies are beginning to show that patterns in nonlinear EEG 
features can be used as biomarkers for many neuropsychiatric disorders (Stam, 2005). 
 
B. Methods 
 
Invariant measures convey information about the dynamics of the system from which 
they are derived. The challenge for clinical neuroscience is to determine which invariant 
measures, if any, are most relevant to detection and monitoring of specific conditions of clinical 
interest. One approach is to compute as many invariant measures as possible from populations of 
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patients with a condition of interest, and from controls, then use statistical learning algorithms to 
find the combinations of features, or feature patterns, that are most highly associated with the 
condition of interest. This data-driven approach may not be sufficient for a complete scientific 
understanding of the relationship between brain dynamics and behavioral, cognitive, or affective 
conditions, but may be sufficient for discovering useful clinical biomarkers. Data-driven 
discovery may also point in the direction of the most likely neural correlates of relevant 
behavioral constructs or cognitive phenotypes (W. Bosl, 2017). 
The primary goal of the methods and results presented in this paper are clinical. We seek 
clinical decision support methods that will eventually provide the practicing physician, 
psychologist, or neurodiagnostic technologist with tools to enable risk assessment for BECTS 
during a child’s routine neurological examination. The ultimate goal is avoiding unnecessary and 
expensive overnight EEG monitoring when possible.   
 
Study Population 
Epilepsy patients and a control group were seen at a tertiary epilepsy center in the 
Division of Epilepsy and Clinical Neurophysiology, Department of Neurology, Boston 
Children’s Hospital (BCH). Patients with benign focal epilepsy of childhood were selected 
retrospectively. BECTS was confirmed by clinical history and EEG findings by an experienced 
neurologist.  Patients were consecutively selected from the epilepsy outpatient clinic at 
Children’s Hospital Boston, and were included if they were between 4 and 16 years old, 
presented with unilateral nocturnal motor seizures, and exhibited uni-or bilateral central-
temporal sleep activated sharp waves with a frontal dipole on interictal EEG. Eleven age-
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matched controls with normal EEG were also selected from the same clinical database. In total, 
19 BECTS patients and 11 controls were used for this study. 
 
Data Collection: 
EEG data was sampled at 200 Hz for all Epilepsy Center subjects. Based on the Nyquist 
criterion, this implies that frequencies up to 100 Hz are included. From the BECTS cases, an 
experienced neurophysiology resident not directly involved in this study used visual review to 
select 30-second samples containing no spikes or evidence of epileptiform activity from awake 
EEG data. Similarly, 30-second segments were selected from awake subjects in the control group 
after visual review. A single segment of equal length was collected on 19 channels located 
according to the standard 10-20 system. EEG samples that were taken during sleep sessions with  
the BECTS patients. These segments were classified into sleep stages 2 and 3 by an experienced 
polysomnographic technologist and reviewed by the resident neurophysiologist. All awake EEG 
samples collected that were chosen, both BECTS cases and controls, appeared normal to the 
neurophysiologist on visual analysis. The sleep segments (BECTS cases only) were likely to 
contain nocturnal epileptiform spikes, but were not reviewed further for this study. No other 
filtering was performed on the EEG signals. 
 
Signal processing 
Multiscale entropy and recurrence quantitative analysis (RQA) values were computed 
from EEG signals using two steps. First, the coarse-graining described by (Costa et al., 2005) 
uses successive averaging of a time series to create new coarse-grained time series. For a 
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window size t, t = 1, 2, … j, the jth coarse-grain series, ytj, is computed by averaging non-
overlapping windows, as shown in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the coarse-graining procedure. Adapted from (Costa, 
Goldberger, & Peng, 2005)  
Multiscale entropy (MSE) was computed using the modified sample entropy defined in 
(Xie, He, & Liu, 2008), which has been used in other studies for complexity analysis of 
physiological time series. Details about computing MSE are discussed in (Bosl et al. 2011).  
Multiscale entropy is a useful nonlinear method for analyze biological signals and distinguishing 
healthy from pathological states (Catarino, Churches, Baron-Cohen, Andrade, & Ring, 2011; 
Costa et al., 2005; Norris, Stein, & Morris, 2008; Takahashi et al., 2010; Vandendriessche et al., 
2014). 
Another approach to computing nonlinear time series properties is recurrence quantitative 
analysis (RQA). RQA is an empirical approach to analyzing time series data and is in principle 
capable of characterizing all of the essential dynamics of a complex system and is useful for 
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analyzing “real-world, noisy, high dimensional data” (Webber & Zbilut, 2005). It has proven to 
be a powerful tool already in physics, geophysics, engineering and biology (Komalapriya et al., 
2008; Norbert Marwan, Romano, Thiel, & Kurths, 2007). Applications to neurology and 
neuroscience are in the early stages. In principle, RQA is capable of detecting significant state 
changes in a dynamical system (Norbert Marwan et al., 2007; Schinkel, Marwan, & Kurths, 
2009; Webber & Marwan, 2015), which suggests that it may be appropriate for detecting 
developmental changes in brain function that are associated with chronic neurological and 
mental dysfunction.  
RQA values were computed for all of the scales derived from each EEG channel using 
publicly available software (N. Marwan, 2012; Norbert Marwan et al., 2007).  For input to the 
algorithms, the embedding dimension (m) was 10, the time delay was 2, and the threshold for the 
recurrence plot (tau) was 30. For detailed discussions of how these values may be determined, 
see (Chen, Zou, & Zhang, 2013; Niknazar, Mousavi, Vahdat, & Sayyah, 2013; Webber & 
Marwan, 2015).  
Multiscale sample entropy was also computed and included in this set of EEG signal 
features and is denoted by SampE as in (W. J. Bosl et al., 2011). Sample entropy and the entropy 
derived from RQA, denoted “L_entr”, are expected to be similar quantitative measures, but 
derived from different algorithms. Thus, multiscale curves were computed for eight features or 
values and each EEG sensor time series. Table 1 lists the nonlinear values computed for this 
study and provides a brief description of their meaning in a physical context. 
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RQA 
Variable Symbol Description 
Recurrence 
rate RR 
The probability that a system state recurs in a finite time. RR 
has been found useful for detecting evoked response potentials 
(ERPs) using single trials (Schinkel et al., 2009).  
Determinism DET 
DET comes from repeating patterns in the system and is an 
indication of its predictability. Regular, deterministic signals, 
such as sine waves, will have higher DET values, while 
uncorrelated time series, such as chaotic processes and random 
numbers, will cause low DET. 
Laminarity LAM 
Laminarity represents the frequency of occurrence of laminar 
states in the system without describing the length of these 
laminar phases. More frequent appearance of laminar states 
may relate to more frequent “seeds” for synchronized dynamics 
(Hirata & Aihara, 2011), which may be related to epileptiform 
spiking on an EEG trace. 
Max line 
length L_max 
Lmax is related to the largest Lyapunov exponent of a chaotic 
signal, which is a dynamic complexity measure that describes 
the divergence of trajectories starting at nearby initial states, 
(Gomez & Hornero, 2010). Lower values are typically 
associated with pathological conditions (Goldberger, 1997; 
Peng, Costa, & Goldberger, 2009).   
Entropy 
derived from 
diagonal 
lines 
L_entr 
This measure of entropy is derived from the diagonal lines of 
the recurrence plot. It is related, but not identical to, other 
measures of entropy, such as the sample entropy used in 
previous studies (W. J. Bosl et al., 2011) 
Trapping 
time TT 
Trapping time is an estimate of the time that a system will 
remain in a given state - “trapped” state. Thus, lower TT values 
may be an indication of more frequent transitions between 
dynamical states and less system stability.   
 
Table 1. Recurrence Quantitative Analysis variables and their interpretation. 
 
C. Results 
 
Significant group differences were found for several RQA features, including recurrence 
rate, determinism, and laminarity, as well as sample entropy. The awake BECTS patients can be 
distinguished from controls with perfect accuracy in our sample population.  
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The scalp plots in the figures show multiscale curves for SampE, RR, DET, and LAM. 
95% confidence intervals are shaded around the curves, demonstrating the relatively small 
variance. 
 
Figure 3. a. Multiscale curve with centrotemporal region highlighted; b. Multiscale 
curves typical of centrotemporal sensors; c. Multiscale entropy curves typical of non-
central region 
 
Determinism (DET) and Laminarity (LAM) have been found in previous studies to be 
lower closer to the epileptic zone in patients with focal epilepsies (Ngamga et al., 2016) 
b. c. 
Sample	Entropy	(SampE) 
a. 
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Figure 4. Multiscale RR curves for awake and asleep cases.  
The separation in BECTS patients between awake multiscale RR curves and the sleep-2 
and sleep-3 curves in the centro-temporal region (Fz, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4) is greater than 
away from this region. 
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Figure 5. Multiscale DET curves for awake and asleep cases. 
 
Lower scale multiscale DET curves show differences in awake BECTS patients between 
the centrotemporal and non-centrotemporal regions.  
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Figure 6. Multiscale LAM curves for awake and asleep cases. 
Similarly, multiscale LAM curves reveal differences in lower scales within the 
centrotemporal region from other regions.  
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Taken together, multiscale entropy, recurrence rate, determinism, and laminarity appear 
to be potential biomarkers for BECTS, and may also be useful as research methods for 
understanding the role of sleep in BECTS nighttime seizures. 
 
D. Discussion 
 
Multiscale analysis, which gives insight into frequency dependence, provides more 
discriminatory information than quantitative EEG analysis nonlinear analysis of original EEG 
signals alone. 
Our results suggest that changes in the nonlinear values (entropy, RR, DET, and LAM) 
from awake to sleep 2 and 3 are different in the centrotemporal region from other regions. This 
raises the question: is this because of epileptiform activity in this region, or are sleep-potentiated 
dynamical changes in this region of the brain promoting epileptic activity in this region. This 
study would be much stronger if sleep stage 2 and 3 EEG measurements were available for the 
control subjects for comparison. It cannot be determined if the differences between awake and 
sleep multiscale curves for BECTS patients are significantly different from differences that 
would be observed in controls in equivalent awake or sleep stages. Although the analysis to 
answer this question would be relatively straightforward, all-night EEG studies are not 
commonly done on patients who do not have a suspected sleep disorder or sleep-potentiated 
epilepsy such as BECTS. Hence, this data may be difficult to obtain. Given the challenges faced 
when trying to access clinical data, as discussed in chapter 1, this was an insurmountable 
problem for this project. 
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Although it is clear that significant differences were found between awake BECTS 
subjects and controls, further analysis is required to determine what neurophysiological 
differences in the BECTS patients is causing the differences. Nevertheless, our analysis 
demonstrates that functional brain differences may be present in BECTS patients even when 
visual review of the awake EEG does not reveal any abnormalities.  
E. Conclusion 
 
Modern classification or statistical learning methods present a challenge for the clinician 
who wants clinical decision support methods that improve patient outcomes through better 
detection or monitoring of treatment progression. Some data analytics methods find patterns in 
data that are correlated with outcomes, as we have shown in our results, yet are somewhat 
opaque. It is difficult to interpret the features and patterns that are predictive in a scientific or 
biomedical conceptualization. This may be secondary to the clinician, but the research scientist 
needs to understand the causes that are producing observed results. Simpler models, such as 
linear regression, make the relationship between the outcome variable and the predictors 
relatively easy to interpret. However, these simple models are unable to discover more complex 
relationships between predictor variables. More complex modeling methods, such as support 
vector machines, decision trees, random forests, and even nearest neighbor methods are more 
difficult to interpret (James, Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2013). They often give better 
predictive results, which may be the primary clinical goal and thus more desirable than 
immediate scientific understanding. 
With the successful implementation of our results into a clinical setting, we can reduce 
the need of overnight EEG monitoring. This is helpful for both patients and families, who can be 
highly inconvenienced by these long stays at a clinic. The successful creation of an algorithm, 
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however, is simply the first step in an implementation process. In order to be implemented as 
clinical decision support, we will need clinical trials with much larger patient populations, sleep 
EEGs for control subjects, and the development of software to analyze EEG data for real-time 
feedback for physicians.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45 
III. References 
Adler-Milstein, J., & Pfeifer, E. (2017). Information Blocking: Is It Occurring and What Policy 
Strategies Can Address It? The Milbank Quarterly, 95(1), 117-135.  
Amatayukal, M. (2003). Another Layer of Regulations: Research Under HIPAA. Journal of 
AHIMA, 74(1), 16A-D.  
Barieri, R. L. (2003). HIPAA: The good, the bad, and the ugly. OBG Management, 15(7), 8-11.  
Benitez, K., & Malin, B. (2010). Evaluating re-identification risks with respect to the HIPAA 
privacy rule. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 17(2), 169-177. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1136/jamia.2009.000026 
Bosl, W. (2017). EEG-Derived Endophenotypes In S. L. Santangelo & V. Jagaroo (Eds.), 
Cognitive and Behavioral Phenotypes: New Trends for Research, Classification, and 
Diagnosis in Neuropsychology and Psychiatry. New York: Springer. 
Bosl, W. J., Tager-Flusberg, H., & Nelson, C. A. (2011). EEG Complexity as a Biomarker for 
Autism Spectrum Disorder. BMC Medicine, 9(18).  
Bowers, D. (2001). The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: is it really all that 
bad? Baylor University Medical Center Proceedings, 14(4), 347-348.  
Burchell, L., Corley, S., Chapman, P., Loomis, R., Marshall, M., Reeves, R., . . . TerMaat, S. 
(2015). [EHRA Information Blocking Response Letter]. 
Callenbach, P. M. C., Bouma, P. A. D., Geerts, A. T., Arts, W. F. M., Stroink, H., Peeters, E. A. 
J., . . . Brouwer, O. F. (2010). Long term outcome of benign childhood epilepsy with 
centrotemporal spikes: 
Dutch Study of Epilepsy in Childhood. Seizure, 19, 501-506.  
Catarino, A., Churches, O., Baron-Cohen, S., Andrade, A., & Ring, H. (2011). Atypical EEG 
complexity in autism spectrum conditions: a multiscale entropy analysis. Clin 
Neurophysiol, 122(12), 2375-2383. doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2011.05.004 
Chavakula, V., Fernández, I. S., Peters, J. M., Popli, G., Bosl, W., Rakhade, S., . . . 
Loddenkemper, T. (2013). Automated quantification of spikes. Epilepsy and Behavior, 
26(2), 143-152. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yebeh.2012.11.048 
Chen, L., Zou, J., & Zhang, J. (2013). Dynamic feature extraction of epileptic EEG using 
recurrence quantification analysis. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 10th World 
Congress on Intelligent Control and Automation (WCICA2012). 
CMS (Producer). (2010). Meaningful Use Stage 1 Requirements Overview. [Presentation] 
Retrieved from https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/downloads/MU_Stage1_ReqOverview.pdf 
CMS. (2017, January 24). Centralized Repository.   Retrieved from 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/CentralizedRepository-.html 
Costa, M., Goldberger, A. L., & Peng, C. K. (2005). Multiscale entropy analysis of biological 
signals. Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys, 71(2 Pt 1), 021906.  
Dunlop, A., Graham, T., Leroy, Z., Glanz, K., & Dunlop, B. (2007). The Impact of HIPAA 
Authorization on Willingness to Participate 
in Clinical Research. Annals of Epidemiology, 17(11), 899-905. 
doi:http://doi.org/10.1016/j.annepidem.2007.05.006 
 46 
Engel, J., Jr. (2001). A proposed diagnostic scheme for people with epileptic seizures and with 
epilepsy: report of the ILAE Task Force on Classification and Terminology. Epilepsia, 
42(6), 796-803. doi:epi10401 [pii] 
Goldberger, A. L. (1997). Fractal variability versus pathologic periodicity: complexity loss and 
stereotypy in disease. Perspect Biol Med, 40(4), 543-561.  
Gomez, C., & Hornero, R. (2010). Entropy and Complexity Analyses in Alzheimer's Disease: An 
MEG Study. Open Biomed Eng J, 4, 223-235. doi:10.2174/1874120701004010223 
TOBEJ-4-223 [pii] 
Gostin, L. O., & Nass, S. (2009). Reforming the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
Safeguarding Privacy and Promoting Research. JAMA, 301(13), 1373-1375. 
doi:10.1001/jama.2009.424 
H.R.34 - 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3010(a)(3) (2016 December 13, 2016). 
H.R. 3103, Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 164 (1996). 
Herdman, R., Moses, H. L., States, U., & (U.S.), N. C. P. F. (2006). Effect of the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule on Health Research : Proceedings of a Workshop Presented to the National Cancer 
Policy Forum, Washington, D.C. 
Hirata, Y., & Aihara, K. (2011). Statistical Tests for Serial Dependence and Laminarity on 
Recurrence Plots. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 1077-1084.  
James, G., Witten, D., Hastie, T., & Tibshirani, R. (2013). An Introduction to Statistical 
Learning. New York: Springer. 
Joost Nicolai, Inge Van Der Linden, Johan B. A. M. Arends, Saskia G. M. Van Mil, Jacobiene 
W. Weber, Johan S. H. Vles, & Aldenkamp, A. P. (2007). EEG Characteristics Related to 
Educational Impairments in Children with Benign Childhood Epilepsy with 
Centrotemporal Spikes. Epilepsia, 48(11), 2093-2100. doi:10.1111/j.1528-
1167.2007.01203.x 
Kemp, B., Varri, A., Rosa, A. C., Nielson, K. D., & Gade, J. (1993). A simple format for 
exchange of digitized polygraphic recordings. Electroencephalography and Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 82(5), 391-393. doi:10.1016/0013-4694(92)90009-7 
Khoury, M. J., & Loannidis, J. P. A. (2014). Big data meets public health. Science, 346(6213), 
1054-1055. doi:10.1126/science.aaa2709 
Komalapriya, C., Thiel, M., Romano, M. C., Marwan, N., Schwarz, U., & Kurths, J. (2008). 
Reconstruction of a system's dynamics from short trajectories. Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin 
Soft Matter Phys, 78(6 Pt 2), 066217.  
Kumekawa, J. (2005). Overview: HIPAA: How Our Health Care World Has Changed. The 
Online Journal of Issues in Nursing, 10(2).  
Kwan, P., & Brodie, M. J. (2001). Neuropsychological effects of epilepsy and antiepileptic 
drugs. The Lancet, 357(9251), 216-222. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-
6736(00)03600-X 
Mandl, K. D., & Kohane, I. S. (2012). Escaping the EHR Trap -- The Future of Health IT. New 
England Journal of Medicine, 322, 2240-2242. doi:10.1056/NEJMp1203102 
Marchibroda, J. (2014). “Health Policy Brief: Interoperability,” Retrieved from 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=122 
Margolis, R., Derr, L., Dunn, M., Huerta, M., Larkin, J., Sheehan, J., . . . Green, E. D. (2014). 
The National Institutes of Health's Big Data to Knowledge (BD2K) initiative: capitalizing 
on biomedical big data. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 21(6), 
957-958. doi:https://doi.org/10.1136/amiajnl-2014-002974 
 47 
Marwan, N. (2012). http://www.recurrence-plot.tk/.    
Marwan, N., Romano, M. C., Thiel, M., & Kurths, J. (2007). Recurrence plots for the analysis of 
complex systems. Physics Reports, 438, 237-329.  
Miziara, C. S. M. G., & Manreza, M. L. G. (2002). Benign Focal Epilepsy of Childhood with 
Centrotemporal Spikes (BECTS). Arq Neuropsiquiatr, 60(2-B), 390-394.  
Ness, R. B. (2007). Influence of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on Health Research. JAMA, 298(18), 
2164-2170. doi:10.1001/jama.298.18.2164 
Ngamga, E. J., Bialonski, S., Marwan, N., Kurths, J., Geier, C., & Lehnertz, K. (2016). 
Evaluation of selected recurrence measures in discriminating pre-ictal and inter-ictal 
periods from epileptic EEG data. Physics Letters A, 380(16), 1419-1425. 
doi:10.1016/J.PHYSLETA.2016.02.024 
NIH. (2003). Institutional Review Boards and the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  Retrieved from 
https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/irbandprivacyrule.asp. 
NIH. (2004). Clinical Research and the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  Retrieved from 
https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/clin_research.asp. 
Niknazar, M., Mousavi, S. R., Vahdat, B. V., & Sayyah, M. (2013). A new framework based on 
recurrence quantification analysis for epileptic seizure detection. IEEE J Biomed Health 
Inform, 17(3), 572-578.  
Norris, P. R., Stein, P. K., & Morris, J. A., Jr. (2008). Reduced heart rate multiscale entropy 
predicts death in critical illness: a study of physiologic complexity in 285 trauma patients. 
J Crit Care, 23(3), 399-405.  
OCR. (2017). Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health 
Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule.    
ONC. (2015). 2015 Report to Congress on Health Information Blocking. Retrieved from 
Washington, DC: 
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/reports/info_blocking_040915.pdf 
Other requirements relating to uses and disclosures of protected health information., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/45/164.514, § 164.514 Stat. (2000 28 December 
2000). 
Peng, C.-K., Costa, M., & Goldberger, A. L. (2009). Adaptive Data Analysis of Complex 
Fluctuations in Physiologic Time Series. Advances in Adaptive Data Analysis, 1(1), 61-
70.  
Schinkel, S., Marwan, N., & Kurths, J. (2009). Brain signal analysis based on recurrences. J 
Physiol Paris, 103(6), 315-323. doi:S0928-4257(09)00029-1 [pii] 
10.1016/j.jphysparis.2009.05.007 
Shields, D., & III, O. C. S. (2009). Benign epilepsy with centrotemporal spikes. Epilepsia, 
50(Suppl. 8), 10-15. doi:10.1111/j.1528-1167.2009.02229.x 
Solove, D. J. (2013). HIPAA Turns 10: Analyzing the Past, Present and Future Impact. Journal 
of AHIMA, 84(4), 22-28.  
Stam, C. J. (2005). Nonlinear dynamical analysis of EEG and MEG: review of an emerging field. 
Clin Neurophysiol, 116(10), 2266-2301.  
Takahashi, T., Cho, R. Y., Mizuno, T., Kikuchi, M., Murata, T., Takahashi, K., & Wada, Y. 
(2010). Antipsychotics reverse abnormal EEG complexity in drug-naive schizophrenia: a 
multiscale entropy analysis. Neuroimage, 51(1), 173-182. doi:S1053-8119(10)00157-6 
[pii] 
 48 
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.02.009 
Vandendriessche, B., Peperstraete, H., Rogge, E., Cauwels, P., Hoste, E., Stiedl, O., . . . 
Cauwels, A. (2014). A multiscale entropy-based tool for scoring severity of systemic 
inflammation. Crit Care Med, 42(8), e560-569. doi:10.1097/CCM.0000000000000299 
Webber, C. L., & Marwan, N. (Eds.). (2015). Recurrence Quantification Analysis. New York: 
Springer. 
Webber, C. L., & Zbilut, J. P. (2005). Recurrence quantitative analysis of nonlinear dynamical 
systems. In M. A. Riley & G. Van Orden (Eds.), Tutorials in contemporary nonlinear 
methods for the behavioral sciences: National Science Foundation. 
Wei, W. (2015). The Effects of HIPAA's Privacy Rule on Medical Research. Faculty Curated 
Undergradate Works, Paper 22.  
Xie, H.-B., He, W.-X., & Liu, H. (2008). Measuring time series regularity using nonlinear 
similarity-based sample entropy. Physics Letters A, 372(48), 7140-7146. 
doi:doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2008.10.049   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49 
IV. Appendix 
A. 18 PHI Identifiers. 
 
 Adapted from ("Other requirements relating to uses and disclosures of protected health 
information.," 2000) 
 
1. Names 
2. Geographic subdivisions greater than state 
a. The initial three digits of a zip code may be included if following conditions are met:  
1. There are more than 20,000 people within the zip codes starting with those three 
digits 
2. The initial three digits of regions that do not have 20,000 people within them are 
changed to 000 
3. All date elements except for year in patients under 89 years old, and all age elements 
(including year) for patients over 89 years old 
4. Telephone numbers 
5. Fax numbers 
6. Electronic mail addresses 
7. Social security numbers 
8. Medical record numbers 
9. Health plan beneficiary numbers 
10. Account numbers 
11. Certificate/license numbers 
12. Vehicle identifiers, serial numbers, and license plate numbers 
13. Device identifiers and serial numbers 
14. Web universal resource locators (URLs) 
15. Internet protocol (IP) address numbers 
16. Biometric identifiers including voice and finger prints  
17. Full face photographs or photographs containing identifying features 
18. Any other unique identifier (except a code created for the original covered entity to be 
capable of re-identification)  
 
 	
